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The epidemic of Ebola haemorrhagic fever in west 
Africa is the 25th known outbreak since 1976,1 but is 
fundamentally diﬀ erent from all previous cases. Besides 
the fact that it is the ﬁ rst Ebola outbreak in west Africa, 
it is the largest and longest Ebola epidemic, and the 
ﬁ rst to involve three entire countries and capital cities, 
with around 5000 cases and 2500 deaths so far.2 How 
could it get to this point? The answer is the synergy of 
several factors that created a perfect storm:3 a context 
of decades of civil war leading to a low level of trust 
in authorities, even when these are working hard to 
reconstruct the country; dysfunctional health services 
with a major scarcity of health workers, especially 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone (another consequence of 
armed conﬂ ict); strong traditional beliefs in disease 
causation and even denial of the virus’ existence; 
high-risk traditional funeral practices that amplify 
transmission, in addition to more recent healing 
practices in some churches where the bodies of 
patients with Ebola are touched; a slow and inadequate 
national and international response (although this is 
now changing); and high population mobility across 
borders—something that has not happened around 
previous outbreaks in central Africa. 
With whole countries aﬀ ected, and an unprecedented 
number of infected and exposed people, the epidemic 
will be far more diﬃ  cult to control than all previous 
outbreaks, which typically occurred around hospitals 
in rural areas or small towns. The sheer scale of the 
outbreak has, in itself, fundamentally changed the 
epidemiology, making the disease control prospects 
bleak. Overwhelmed treatment and isolation facilities 
turn patients away, so they remain in the community 
for longer, resulting in even more cases. So the main 
diﬀ erence between this and previous epidemics is 
merely scale, not a mutated Ebola virus.
With a doubling time of around 2 weeks in Monrovia, 
Liberia,2 the window of opportunity for control becomes 
ever narrower. The risk is also very real that other 
neighbouring countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, will soon 
be aﬀ ected, although Senegal seems to have eﬀ ectively 
averted an outbreak following the introduction of Ebola 
infection to the country by a Guinean man.4
The west African epidemic has profoundly changed 
how we view Ebola virus infection, which has 
transformed from a rare event in central Africa into 
a major public health and destabilising humanitarian 
crisis. This situation was totally unexpected, but perhaps 
it should not have been. A recent analysis5 of the ﬁ rst 
epidemic in 1976 in Yambuku (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo) suggests that even here, reproduction 
number, R0, in the community (not just the hospital) 
was probably greater than one. This ﬁ nding implies 
that a large-scale community outbreak was always 
possible given suﬃ  cient time. The recent epidemic has 
conﬁ rmed that R0 for Ebola in African communities 
seems to be substantially higher than one, which 
implies that even if we curtail this outbreak, we should 
expect another major one to occur eventually.5 
This shift in thinking has major implications for what 
is needed to stop the epidemic. Caring for patients, 
isolating infectious individuals, protecting health staﬀ  
and other caregivers, safe burials, and contact tracing 
are the keystones of epidemic control. However, in 
the face of a massive epidemic with tens of thousands 
of contacts, implementation challenges of operating 
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at a large enough scale are formidable. Additionally, 
the eﬀ ectiveness of such approaches might be greatly 
reduced and insuﬃ  cient to completely eliminate virus 
transmission. Thanks to the very professional, and 
often heroic, work of Médecins sans Frontieres and 
local partners, we know how to care for patients in 
such resource-poor settings and how to avoid Ebola 
transmission in hospital settings—a key component 
of the response, given that around 150 health-care 
workers have already died in this epidemic. What is less 
clear is how to signiﬁ cantly reduce transmission in the 
community, including how to manage holding centres 
and those who have fever, and what the incentives 
are to change risky traditional burial practices. This 
is a research agenda that could potentially have an 
immediate eﬀ ect on epidemic control. 
Trials of experimental therapies, starting with the use 
of hyperimmune plasma or serum from convalescent 
patients, will begin soon, and should lead to much 
reduced mortality and transmission. The scale of the 
epidemic might have reached the point that it can no 
longer be controlled without a vaccine, and Ebola could 
become endemic in large communities. Whether the 
vaccine trials starting now can still make a diﬀ erence 
in the present epidemic is unlikely, unless it continues 
for a very long time or Ebola becomes endemic in west 
Africa. 
Now is also the time to address the huge economic 
and societal havoc that Ebola is causing in the region, 
while planning for rebuilding of health systems and 
disease surveillance. 
For the ﬁ rst time in a period of peace, the military are 
engaging in epidemic control to a major degree. Other 
nations should follow the USA’s initiative in Liberia. 
The Ebola crisis needs every institution to play its part 
since the eﬀ ort is still not commensurate with the 
actual and potential threat to people in west Africa 
and possibly elsewhere. That includes also academic 
institutions and the UK National Health Service, as 
now made possible following a letter by the Chief 
Medical Oﬃ  cer inviting staﬀ  to volunteer in west 
Africa. 
Other outbreaks of Ebola will occur, as the 
populations exposed to the probable virus reservoir 
are expanding in Africa6 and the potential for a large 
epidemic remains where fertile ground for it exists. 
This has major implications for the future. A large 
epidemic can—and will—happen again, unless we 
always remain extremely vigilant , respond promptly, 
and have more to oﬀ er than isolation and quarantine.
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Digital surveillance for enhanced detection and response 
to outbreaks
In 2014, the Director-General of WHO declared 
two public health emergencies of international 
concern: poliomyelitis and Ebola virus disease. These 
declarations have refocused attention on the use of 
the International Health Regulations (2005) to identify 
public health emergencies and to the challenges that 
state parties face in their assessment. The International 
Health Regulations (2005) is the principal document 
that governs international surveillance and response 
to global public health risks and emergencies.1 The 
document aims to strengthen state parties’ abilities 
to monitor, detect, assess, and report public health 
hazards in a way that does not adversely aﬀ ect cross-
border travel and trade.2 The regulations contain a 
decision-making matrix that guides state parties’ 
assessment and notiﬁ cation of potential public health Den
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